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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates the effect on international trade of multilateral trade agreements: the
World Trade Organization (WTO), its predecessor the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) extended from rich countries to
developing countries. I use a standard “gravity” model of bilateral merchandise trade and a large
panel data set covering over fifty years and 175 countries. An extensive search reveals little evidence
that countries joining or belonging to the GATT/WTO have different trade patterns than outsiders.
The GSP does seem to have a strong effect, and is associated with an approximate doubling of trade.
Andrew K. Rose






1:  Heresy 
  Economists disagree about a lot, but not everything.  Almost all of us think that 
international trade should be free.
1  Accordingly, the multilateral organization charged with 
freeing trade – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – is probably the most popular 
international institution inside the profession, certainly compared with its obvious rivals, the IMF 
and the World Bank.  This makes much of the furor over the WTO unfathomable to most of us.  
But should we – and the protestors – really care about the WTO at all?  Do we really know that 
the WTO and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have actually 
promoted trade? 
Maybe not.  While theory, casual empiricism, and strong statements abound, there is, to 
my knowledge, no compelling empirical evidence showing that the GATT/WTO has actually 
encouraged trade.  In this paper, I provide the first comprehensive econometric study of the 
effect of the postwar multilateral agreements on trade.  It turns out that membership in the 
GATT/WTO is not associated with enhanced trade, once standard factors have been taken into 
account.  To be more precise, countries acceding or belonging to the GATT/WTO do not have 
significantly different trade patterns than non-members.  Not all multilateral institutions have 
been ineffectual; I find that the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) extended from the 
North to developing countries approximately doubles trade.  Thus the data and methodology 
clearly can deliver strong results.  I conclude that we currently do not have strong empirical 
evidence that the GATT/WTO has systematically played a strong role in encouraging trade. 
 
Plain Vanilla  2
To make my argument as persuasive as possible I use widely accepted techniques, a 
conventional empirical methodology, and two standard data sets.  I also examine the sensitivity 
of my results extensively.  I do not attempt to provide any novelty in terms of data, theory, or 
methodology.  Thus, any interest in this paper lies solely in its results; by design, there is no 
other innovation.
2 
The next section of the paper provides motivation, while sections 3 and 4 present the 
methodology and data set respectively.  A graphical event study of accession to the GATT/WTO 
is presented in section 5.  The main results are discussed in section 6, followed by sensitivity 
analysis.  The paper closes with suggestions for future work, and some interpretation. 
 
2:  A Person of Straw? 
Does anyone believe that the multilateral trading system boosts trade?  The WTO, for 
one.  It states that its “overriding objective is to help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly and 
predictably.”
3  And it believes that the system has been working.  The WTO trumpeted the 
fiftieth anniversary of the multilateral trading system in 1998 affirming  “… The achievements of 
the system are well worth celebrating.  Since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade began 
operating from Geneva in 1948, world merchandise trade has increased 16 fold … world trade 
now grows roughly three times faster than merchandise output … this advance ranks among the 
great international economic achievements of the post-world war era …”
4  Further, “The past 50 
years have seen an exceptional growth in world trade.  Merchandise exports grew on average by 
6% annually.  Total trade in 2000 was 22-times the level of 1950.  GATT and the WTO have 
helped to create a strong and prosperous trading system contributing to unprecedented growth.”
5  3
While some (mostly non-economists) might disagree with the view that trade should be 
freed by the multilateral system, it is hard to find dissent with the view that trade has been 
liberalized by the system.  For instance, the Economist declared in 1999 “For five decades the 
world’s multilateral trade-liberalising machinery … has, in all likelihood, done more to attack 
global poverty and advance living standards right across the planet than any other man-made 
device … such is the power of trade.”
6  There are innumerable estimates of the effect of this or 
that GATT round on country x or industry y; all implicitly assume that the multilateral trading 
system matters.  Similarly, much hoopla surrounds the accession of countries to the WTO, as the 
system extracts concessions from joiners to benefit current members.
7 
 
3:  Nerdy Stuff 
Quantifying the effects of the multilateral system on trade seems a worthy objective.  
Luckily, it is also feasible. 
To estimate the effect of multilateral trade agreements on international trade, I rely on the 
standard “gravity” model of bilateral trade, which explains (the natural logarithm of) trade with 
(the logs of) the distance between the countries and their joint income.  I augment the basic 
gravity equation with a number of extra conditioning variables that affect trade, in order to 
account for as many extraneous factors as possible.  These include: culture (e.g., whether a pair 
of countries share a common language), geography (e.g., whether none, one or both are 
landlocked), and history (e.g., whether one colonized the other).   
My empirical strategy is to control for as many “natural” causes of trade as possible, and 
search for effects of multilateral agreements in the residual.  Once other factors have been taken 
into account, I compare trade patterns for countries in the GATT/WTO with those outside the  4
system.  I search for this effect using variation across countries (since not all countries are in the 
system) and time (since membership of the GATT/WTO has grown).  If the GATT/WTO has a 
large effect on trade, I expect members to have significantly higher trade than outsiders. 
For those unfamiliar with the gravity model, it is a completely conventional device used 
to estimate the effects of a variety of phenomena on international trade.  Unusually for 
economics, it is also a successful model, in two senses.  First, the estimated effects of distance 
and output (the traditional gravity effects) are sensible, economically and statistically significant, 
and reasonably consistent across studies.  Second, the gravity model explains most of the 
variation in international trade.  That is, the model seems reliable and fits the data well.  A fine 
track for this train.
8 
The exact specification of the gravity model used below is: 
 
ln(Xijt) = β 0 + β 1lnDij + β 2ln(YiYj)t + β 3ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)t + β 4Langij + β 5Contij  
+ β 6Landlij + β 7Islandij +β 8ln(AreaiAreaj) + β 9ComColij  + β 10CurColijt   
+ β 11Colonyij  + β 12ComNatij + β 13CUijt + β 14FTAijt, + Σ tφ tTt  
+ γ 1Bothinijt + γ 2Oneinijt + γ 3GSPijt  + ε ijt 
 
where i and j denotes trading partners, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as: 
 
•  Xijt denotes the average value of real bilateral trade between i and j at time t, 
•  Y is real GDP, 
•  Pop is population, 
•  D is the distance between i and j, 
•  Lang is a binary “dummy” variable which is unity if i and j have a common language and 
zero otherwise, 
•  Cont is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border,  5
•  Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2). 
•  Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2), 
•  Area is the area of the country (in square kilometers), 
•  ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with the 
same colonizer, 
•  CurCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t, 
•  Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa, 
•  ComNat is a binary variable which is unity if i and j remained part of the same nation during 
the sample (e.g., France and Guadeloupe), 
•  CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t, 
•  FTA is a binary variable which is unity if i and j both belong to the same regional trade 
agreement, 
•  {Tt} is a comprehensive set of time “fixed effects”, 
•  β  and φ  are vectors of nuisance coefficients,  
•  Bothinijt is a binary variable which is unity if both i and j are GATT/WTO members at t,  
•  Oneinijt is a binary variable which is unity if either i or j is a GATT/WTO member at t, 
•  GSPijt is a binary variable which is unity if i was a GSP beneficiary of j or vice versa at t, and 
•  ε ij represents the omitted other influences on bilateral trade, assumed to be well behaved. 
 
The parameters of interest to me are γ 1, γ 2, and γ 3.  The first coefficient is the most 
interesting; it measures the effect on international trade if both countries are GATT/WTO 
members.  The second coefficient measures the trade effect if one country is a member and the 
other is not.  If trade is created when both countries are in the GATT/WTO γ 1 should be positive; 
if trade is diverted from non-members, then γ 2 may be negative.
9  γ 3 measures the effect of the 
GSP on trade. 
I estimate the gravity model using ordinary least squares, computing standard errors that 
are robust to clustering by country-pairs.  I also include a comprehensive set of year-specific 
“fixed” effects to account for such factors as the value of the dollar, the global business cycle,  6
the extent of globalization, oil shocks, and so forth.  Since the data set is a (country-pair x time) 
panel I also use “random effects” (GLS) and “fixed effects” (“within”) estimators as robustness 
checks (unless otherwise noted, fixed- and random-effects are always country-pair specific). 
 
4:  Blah, blah, blah 
The trade data for the regressand comes from the “Direction of Trade” (DoT) CD-ROM 
data set developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  It covers bilateral merchandise 
trade between 178 IMF trading entities between 1948 and 1999 (with gaps); a list of the 
countries is included in appendix 2.  (Not all the trading entities are “countries” in the traditional 
sense of the word; I use the word simply for convenience.)  I include all countries for which the 
Fund provides data, so that almost all global trade is covered.
10  Bilateral trade on FOB exports 
and CIF imports is recorded in American dollars; I deflate trade by the American CPI for all 
urban consumers (1982-1984=100; taken from www.freelunch.com).  An average value of 
bilateral trade between a pair of countries is created by averaging all of the (four possible) 
measures potentially available (exports from i to j, imports into j from i, and so forth).  It is well 
known that trade has grown quickly since the Second World War, and that is reflected in this 
data set.  From 1948 through the end of the sample in 1999, global trade increased on average by 
over eight percent annually.
11 
Population and real GDP data (in constant American dollars) have been obtained from 
standard sources: the Penn World Table, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
12   
I exploit the CIA’s World Factbook for a number of country-specific variables.
13  These 
include: latitude and longitude, land area, landlocked and island status, physically contiguous  7
neighbors, language, colonizers, and dates of independence.  I use these to create great-circle 
distance and the other controls.   
I add information on whether the pair of countries was involved in a currency union, 
using Glick-Rose (2002).
14  I obtain data from the World Trade Organization to create an 
indicator of regional trade agreements, and include: ASEAN, EEC/EC/EU; US-Israel FTA; 
NAFTA; CARICOM; PATCRA; ANZCERTA; CACM, SPARTECA, and Mercosur.
15  I 
initially assume that all RTAs have the same effect on trade, but relax this assumption below. 
 
The Unusual Suspects 
To all this, I add the key variables of GATT/WTO membership.  The website of the 
WTO provides dates for accession of its members to the GATT/WTO.
16  Thirty-two trading 
entities were either founding members (technically “contracting parties”) of the GATT or were 
covered because of their relationship with a founding member (e.g., French Polynesia and 
Bermuda).
17  These countries began the sample in 1948 covered by the GATT, and include many 
large important countries (e.g., Belgium, Brazil, Canada, India, the Netherlands, South Africa, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States).  From the outset, most international trade has been 
conducted by GATT/WTO members.
18 
After GATT’s creation, outsiders joined over time.  For instance, Italy and Sweden were 
among the nine countries that acceded in 1950, Germany joined in 1951 (along with Austria, 
Peru, and Turkey), and Japan joined in 1955.  By 1960, 50 countries were covered by the GATT; 
by 1970 the number had risen to 90, and by 1990 to 112.
19  As of July 2002, there were a total of 
158 trading partners covered by the 144 members of the WTO; there were also a number (29) of 
WTO “observers” who are required to begin negotiations for WTO membership within five  8
years (including Algeria, Andorra, Russia, and Saudi Arabia).  In addition, a number of countries 
(e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, and Syria) are neither members nor observers of the WTO.  
The GATT conducted eight “rounds” of multilateral trade negotiations before it was 
subsumed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995: Geneva (concluded in 1947); 
Annecy (1949); Torquay (1951); Geneva (1956); Dillon (1961); Kennedy (1967); Tokyo (1979); 
and Uruguay (1994).  In most of my work I maintain the hypothesis that the effect of the 
GATT/WTO on trade does not vary over time, but again I examine the importance of this 
assumption below. 
The last (and least important) coefficient of interest to me concerns the impact of the 
much-derided Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) on Trade.  The UN publishes Operation 
and Effects of the Generalized System of Preferences at intervals; these booklets contain 
information on which countries extend trade concessions to which developing country 
beneficiaries under the GSP.  I have obtained this pamphlet for 1974, 1979, and 1984 and use 
this information to construct bilateral time-varying GSP relationships.
20 
Descriptive statistics on the variables are available in appendix 1.  It shows that the key 
GATT/WTO and GSP variables are not highly correlated with most of the gravity variables.  The 
only exception is the GSP dummy, which is positively correlated with both real GDP variables, 
as one might expect (given that richer countries are those that extend the GSP concessions).  In 
other words, multicollinearity is not a problem for the coefficients of interest.
21 
 
5:  A Thousand Words 
A preliminary look at the data leads one to believe that entry into the GATT/WTO has a 
strong positive effect on trade.  Figure 1 is a set of graphical “event studies” which look at  9
bilateral trade around the dates of GATT/WTO entry.  The top left-hand diagram examines the 
natural logarithm of real bilateral trade in the five years before, during (marked by the vertical 
line), and after entry; it considers trade between a new entrant and non-members.  The middle 
line (with circles) shows the mean level of trade, while the two other lines show a confidence 
interval of plus and minus two standard deviations.  The diagram in the top right-hand corner is 
the analogue showing trade between a country joining the GATT/WTO and other members. 
The two graphs deliver the same message.  While trade is stagnant or even falling slightly 
in the five years before entry into the multilateral trade system, it seems to begin rising 
coincident with entry and continue rising for at least five years.  This increase in trade is both 
economically and statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the variable portrayed in the top pair of graphics 
is the unadjusted log of real trade.  The graphics at the bottom of Figure 1 are analogues that plot 
the residual from the gravity equation of trade.  That is, I regress the log of real trade on the 
gravity variables (with the exception of GATT/WTO and GSP membership) and plot the 
residuals, as before, around the time of GATT/WTO accession (more details on the regressions 
are provided below).  The residuals are always insignificantly different from zero and do not rise 
significantly with entry into the GATT/WTO.  That is, countries joining the GATT/WTO neither 
have significantly different trade from non-members, nor do they experience increases in trade, 
holding other factors constant. 
 
If It’s Worth Saying Once 
Figure 2 is an analogous event study, which examines aggregate openness (that is, 
exports plus imports divided by GDP) instead of (the log of) bilateral trade.  I use data from the  10
Penn World Table mark 6, which covers the years from 1950 through 1998.  During this period, 
104 countries joined the GATT/WTO.  Yet aggregate openness did not vary significantly from 
the five years preceding GATT/WTO entry through the five years after accession, as can be seen 
from the top left graphic in Figure 2.  The other three diagrams in the figure are analogous event 
studies, which plot the residuals once openness has been regressed on the natural logarithms of 
both real GDP and real GDP per capita.
22  Since the data set is a panel with data for a number of 
countries and years, I show the residuals from: a) a standard regression; b) a regression which 
includes a comprehensive set of (49) year-specific fixed effects; and c) a regression which 
includes (158) country-specific fixed effects.  There is little evidence that GATT/WTO entry has 
a strong significant effect on the ratio of aggregate trade to GDP in any of the graphics. 
More evidence of the weak relationship between aggregate openness and GATT/WTO 
membership can be found in the appendix graphics A1 through A4.  These are simple time-series 
plots of openness against time, for 98 countries that joined the GATT/WTO between 1950 and 
1998 (the span of the PWT6 data set); a vertical line marks entry into the GATT/WTO.
23  It is 
possible to find cases where entry is followed by a gradual rise in openness (e.g., Argentina and 
Austria).  But it is also possible to find cases where entry is followed by a fall in openness (e.g., 
Belize and Botswana), or where little happens (e.g., Denmark and the Dominican Republic).
24 
 
6:  The Sexy Part 
  The event studies of the previous section provide little evidence that membership in the 
GATT/WTO stimulates trade.  But while the visual evidence is intriguing, it may not be 
completely persuasive.  In this section I use standard regression analysis to isolate the effects of  11
the multilateral trading system on trade.  It turns out that using this extra econometric firepower 
delivers the same (non-)result. 
  Table 1 contains benchmark regression results.  My default specification is the 
augmented gravity model, estimated with ordinary least squares, year fixed effects, and robust 
standard errors over the full sample.  This specification (labeled “Default”) appears at the 
extreme left of Table 1. 
  The good news is that the model works well.  Countries that are farther apart trade less, 
while economically larger and richer countries trade more.
25  These traditional gravity effects are 
not only large but economically sensible in size, highly statistically significant, and in line with 
estimates from the literature.  Countries belonging to the same regional trade association trade 
more, as do countries sharing a language, or land border.  Landlocked countries trade less, as do 
physically larger countries.  A shared colonial history encourages trade.  (Heck, even the 
notorious currency union effect has an economically and statistically significant effect.)  These 
effects are sensible and explain almost two-thirds of the variation in bilateral trade.  Thus, the 
gravity equation seems to have done a good job in explaining most of the reasons why 
international trade varies across almost a quarter-million observations. 
Above and beyond these gravity effects, does membership in the GATT/WTO have any 
substantial effect on trade?  No.  The dummy variables for one or both of the countries being 
GATT/WTO members both have small negative coefficients.  Neither is statistically different 
from zero at conventional significance levels.  No reasonable person believes that membership in 
the GATT or WTO actually reduces trade, so I prefer to interpret the negative coefficients as a 
mystery rather than an indictment.  Still, by way of contrast, extension of the GSP from one 
country to another seems to have a large positive effect on trade.  Since the regressand is the  12
natural logarithm of real trade, the GSP is estimated to raise trade over one hundred percent 
(since exp(.86) -1 ≈  136%)!  That is, the data manifestly can yield positive effects.
26 
The rest of Table 1 contains a set of robustness checks, presented in columns to the right 
of the default.  The first perturbation drops all data from industrial countries.
27  The second uses 
only data after 1970.  Finally, I add country-specific fixed effects to the benchmark equation at 
the extreme left of the table.
28  The key result – that membership in the GATT/WTP is associated 
with an economically and statistically insignificant increase in trade – seems robust.  Indeed, six 
of the eight coefficients are actually negative (though usually insignificantly so).   The largest 
coefficient in Table 1 indicates that a pair of countries both in the GATT traded only (exp(.15)-
1≈ ) 16% more than a pair of countries outside the GATT.  This is small compared to other 
effects (e.g., regional trade associations), the long-term growth of trade, intuition, and the hype 
surrounding the GATT/WTO. 
To summarize, I have been unable to find evidence that membership in the GATT/WTO 
has had a strong positive effect on international trade.  But since the GSP is associated with an 
approximate doubling of trade, it seems that the data (rather than the methodology) are 
delivering the negative message.  Some aspects of the multilateral trading system seem to matter; 
but not the obvious ones. 
 
7:  Raising Deflector Shields 
  Regressions can be run in a number of ways.  If my results were the result of a peculiar or 
idiosyncratic methodology, they would be suspect.  I now go to some pains to show that they are 
not particularly sensitive to reasonable perturbations in my methodology.  13
Table 1 pools data across years, as I exploit both time-series and cross-sectional variation 
in the data set.  I present purely cross-sectional evidence in Table 2.  In particular, I tabulate the 
estimates of {γ 1,γ 2,γ 3} when the gravity equation is estimated on individual years at five-year 
intervals.  (The gravity regressors are of course included in the regression; they are simply not 
tabulated to avoid clutter.)  It is certainly possible to find positive significant effects of 
GATT/WTO membership on trade, if one looks carefully; the data from the 1950s show positive 
and significant effects of GATT membership.  However, these coefficients shrink in the 1960s 
with the large expansion of the GATT and turn negative in the 1970s.  The effects are also small 
in the 1980s and unstable in the 1990s. 
  A different issue is whether the effects of GATT/WTO membership have varied over 
time.  The GATT conducted eight multilateral rounds of trade liberalization; the conclusions of 
the rounds seem obvious break points.  Accordingly, in Table 3 I split both γ 1 and γ 2 into eight 
pieces, one for each GATT round.  Thus the top row of coefficients shows the effect of GATT 
membership for 1948 (that is, prior to the conclusion of the Annecy round); the second set shows 
the effect from the Annecy round through the period prior to the conclusion of the Torquay 
round, and so forth.  There is clearly (statistically and economically) significant variation in the 
coefficients across trade rounds.  Nevertheless, it is striking that the only economically large 
effects are estimated for the first one or two rounds, and most of these are statistically 
insignificant.  Cognoscenti may prefer the fixed-effects estimation shown at the right of the table 
that focus even more exclusively on time-series variation, since any features which are constant 
over time for a pair of countries (such as geography, culture, and history) are taken out.  Yet 
these “within” estimates are economically moderate, often insignificant and sometimes negative.  14
  Do the effects of the system vary systematically by region or income class?  The answer 
is yes … but there is still little evidence that belonging to the GATT/WTO really matters.  Table 
4 repeats the default estimates of the key parameters in the top row, and then tabulates estimates 
for nine different cuts of the sample.  I consider five different regional groupings and four 
different income groupings.  Thus the “South Asia” row tabulates {γ 1,γ 2,γ 3} when the equation is 
estimated over observations which include at least one observation from a South Asian country.  
Analogous estimates for four other regions and four income groupings follow.
29  The results are 
easy to summarize.  The GSP estimates remain economically and statistically significant 
throughout; but GATT/WTO membership seems to have a negligible (often negative) effect.  
The only exception is trade for South Asia, where the GATT/WTO effect is economically large 
but statistically marginal. 
 
More for Dweebs 
  Further sensitivity analysis is presented in Table 5, which tabulates estimates of {γ 1,γ 2,γ 3} 
for sixteen slices of the sample.  The first pair of experiments splits the pooled data set into 
halves by time.  I next divide the sample by country groupings, and include only data for: a) 
industrial countries; b) non-African countries; c) countries outside Latin America and the 
Caribbean; d) non-OPEC countries; and e) observations which exclude regional trade 
agreements.
30  I then successively drop the poorest quarter of the data set (as gauged by real GDP 
per capita), and the smallest quarter of the data set (as gauged by total real GDP).  I also drop the 
observations with the largest outlying residuals.
31  Finally I report results for bilateral trade 
between each of the G-7 countries and the rest of the world.
32  15
Only one of these perturbations has any important positive effect on the key coefficients.  
In particular, when I restrict the sample of countries to the industrial countries only, GATT/WTO 
membership has a somewhat important effect on trade.  My estimate indicates that a pair of 
industrial GATT/WTO members trades about 60% (≈ exp(.47)-1) more than an otherwise-
identical pair of non-members.  This result is not of overwhelming statistical significance, and 
even its economic importance is less than dramatic.
33 
Having messed with the sample, I fiddle with the model in Table 6.  First, I add quadratic 
gravity terms as nuisance variables, since some authors have found these terms important.  Next 
I drop the set of year dummies.  I also record the coefficients when each of the ten regional trade 
agreements is allowed to have its own separate effect on trade.
34  In a separate experiment I 
attempt to provide a sharper test for trade creation and diversion by adding a control for third-
country trade.  In particular, I include (the log of) aggregate trade from either country to the rest 
of the world (excluding the bilateral trade between the pair).
35  
Another set of robustness checks concern the estimation technique.  First, I re-estimate 
everything using five-year averages in place of annual observations.  I then tabulate the results of 
panel estimators that treat country-pairs as both random- and fixed-effects (there are two sets of 
estimates; one without year effects, and another with year effects).   I also employ the trendy 
“treatment” estimator developed by Heckman and co-authors.  There are two sets of maximum 
likelihood estimates presented.  The first compares trade when both countries are GATT/WTO 
members to the case where neither is; the second compares trade between non-members and the 
case where just one of the countries is a GATT/WTO member.
36  These estimates are of 
particular interest since small poor countries are less likely to trade and also less likely to be 
GATT/WTO members.
37  The treatment methodology attempts to correct for this selection bias,  16
yet it delivers even more negative results.  I then tabulate coefficients estimated from weighted 
least squares (using real GDP as weights), a robust median estimator, and a Tobit estimator 
(since trade cannot be negative).
38 
The final checks in Table 6 consist in adding a lag of the dependent variable in two 
different ways: OLS with year effects, and the Arellano-Bond panel GMM estimator.
39  Adding 
the lagged dependent variable with OLS has little effect on the primary coefficients of interest, 
which remain negative.  Nevertheless, the lagged dependent variable itself is highly significant 
with a coefficient of .81.
40  This leads one to suspect that dynamic effects could be important.  
After all, effective entry into the multilateral trading system may take time.  Still, it is striking 
that none of the robustness checks of Table 6 deliver economically substantial effects of the 
GATT or WTO on trade. 
I incorporate dynamics in a number of other ways in Table 7.  First, to the basic model I 
add in the extreme left, a set of dummy variables which are unity if either i or j entered the 
GATT/WTO five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years ago.  The coefficients are positive and significant, 
possibly indicating a delayed effect of membership on trade.  On the other hand, this may simply 
indicate highly persistent serially correlated disturbances.  Indeed so; the Prais-Winsten estimates 
in the second column show small effects of the GATT/WTO both contemporaneously and (in the 
next column) including lags, so long as the (considerable) serial correlation is accounted for.  
The right-hand side of the table shows that the same results are true if one uses country-pair 
random effects estimators, a simple robustness check.  That is, once autoregressive errors (or a 
lagged dependent variable) are incorporated, the effects of GATT/WTO membership are small 
both contemporaneously and after taking into account lags.  It seems that dynamic considerations 
do not reveal an economically substantive role for the GATT/WTO.
41  17
 
Only for Geeks 
A few issues are worth addressing which are even more technical.   
There is little measurement error with respect to the date of a country’s formal accession 
to the GATT/WTO.
42  Reverse causality is not the problem that it ordinarily is in such exercises.  
Countries may join the WTO/GATT in order to increase trade, but that would tend to bias the 
key coefficients upwards.  Still, both issues can in principle be handled with instrumental 
variable estimators … so long as the latter are available.  The difficulty in practice is finding 
variables that are correlated with bilateral GATT/WTO membership.  I have experimented with 
two sets of instrumental variables: 1) measures of democracy and polity, and 2) measures of 
freedom, civil rights and political rights.
43  I use the sets of instrumental variables a) both 
separately and together, b) on both the entire panel and on individual cross-sections, and c) in 
two different functional forms (the log of product of the countries’ values, and the simple sum of 
the values).  Still, essentially all the results are poor.  In particular, estimates of the key 
parameters are implausibly large in absolute value, often negative, and statistically marginal.  
The issue is primarily poor fit in the first stage; my dummy variables for GATT/WTO 
membership are poorly correlated with the instrumental variables.  Since this topic is only of 
academic interest, I relegate the results to Appendix 4; others may choose to pursue this further.  
Missing data is a potential problem.  There are two distinct issues: 1) missing trade data 
(since trade cannot be less than zero); and 2) missing regressor data, primarily GDP.  The first 
issue has been the subject of more research, and has already been discussed.  The second issue 
may be more important in practice; small poor countries typically have their trade recorded but 
are less likely to have national accounts data.  Without GDP data, these observations are dropped  18
from the regression analysis, seriously reducing the sample size in a non-random way.
44  
Econometrics has developed a number of techniques including various ways of interpolating or 
estimating missing data (e.g., Gourieroux and Monfort, 1981; surveys are provided by Griliches, 
1986 and Little, 1992).  These typically improve the efficiency of the parameters of interest, 
while sometimes introducing bias; my strategy of working with non-randomly selected data does 
not introduce bias so long as the selection is based on an independent variable (Wooldridge, 
2000 p. 299).  Given my interest in the point estimates I do not find these estimators compelling, 
but it seems a reasonable topic for future research. 
I conclude that my key findings are robust.  Membership in the GATT/WTO seems not to 
have an economically or statistically significant effect on trade, while the GSP encourages trade. 
 
Alright Already 
Is it possible to understand why economists have assumed that the GATT has been so 
important in encouraging trade?  It is possible to shed a little light on the issue by stripping down 
the regression model.  Table 8 contains the benchmark pooled results at the extreme left-hand 
side, taken directly from Table 1.  I then drop the augmenting regressors in the next column (i.e., 
I set β 4 - β 14 to zero), leaving only a stripped-down gravity model.  This barely alters the key 
coefficients (or the fit of the model).  But if I drop the essential gravity variables – distance and 
output – from the model, I can estimate a highly significant positive effect of GATT/WTO 
membership on trade.  In particular, the estimates show that a pair of members share 345% 
(≈ exp(1.24)) the level of trade of a pair of non-members.  The difference between this huge 
effect and the small (negative) effect of the benchmark result is analogous to the difference 
between the substantial trend visible in the top part of Figure 1 and the negligible effect in the  19
bottom of the same graphic.  That is, the GATT/WTO seems to have a huge effect on trade if one 
does not hold other things constant; the multilateral trade regime matters, ceteris non paribus.   
Simply taking into account standard gravity effects essentially eradicates any large effect of the 
GATT/WTO on bilateral trade.
45 
  This paper reports 83 sets of estimates of the parameters of interest, including 80 
estimates of γ 1, the effect of GATT/WTO membership (by both countries) on trade.
46  The mean 
estimate across these 80 γ 1 estimates is .05; the median is .02; 39 of the estimates are negative, 
while only four are greater than .69 (implying that GATT/WTO membership doubles trade), 
none reliably so.
47  These seem small compared to both conventional gravity effects (such as the 
effect of regional trade agreements), and to the considerable growth in trade (both absolute and 
relative to income).  Fifty-seven (or 71%) of the associated t-statistics are insignificant at 
conventional confidence levels, in a setting where t-ratios commonly exceed 5 and often twenty.  
My interpretation: the regression analysis is saying (albeit with the whisper associated with 
negative results) that there is little evidence that GATT/WTO membership has a substantial 
positive effect on trade.
48 
 
8:  The Next Generation 
I have estimated the effect of the multilateral system on trade in a number of ways.  
Others may wish to boldly go further. 
All the work above has focused on total trade.  It is possible that GATT/WTO accession 
has different effects on exports and imports.
49  Alternatively, decomposing trade by industry may 
be interesting since the multilateral trade system has been less successful at liberalizing trade in 
e.g., agriculture, textiles.  Investigating the impact of the multilateral system on trade in services  20
is also a potential subject for future work.  The key issue here is data availability.  The OECD 
has just released bilateral data, but it only covers basically rich countries for 1999-2000. 
De jure accession to the multilateral system may not be the same as de facto accession.  
Implicit accession may either lead formal accession (if countries wish to gain from freer trade 
before joining or ingratiate themselves with the GATT/WTO to smooth accession) or lag it (if 
implementing GATT/WTO rules takes time).  I cannot currently quantify de facto accession, but 
others may be more able. 
I have found little persuasive evidence that trade between GATT/WTO members and 
non-members is lower than might otherwise be expected.  Instead γ 2 is, on the whole, basically 
zero.  The glass is half-full: it looks like there is not potentially harmful trade diversion.  Cold 
comfort, given the dearth of indications of beneficial trade creation.
50  Still, a more structural 
approach may bring sharper results. 
Do other parts of the multilateral international economic order matter?  The most obvious 
question to ask is whether membership in the IMF affects my results.  After all, the Fund was 
created in part to facilitate trade.
51  I added a pair of dummies for membership in the IMF, 
analogous to those used for GATT/WTO membership; the results are tabulated in the extreme 
right of Table 8.
52  Clearly controlling for IMF membership does not affect my conclusion.  It is 
also interesting that membership in the Fund seems not to facilitate trade, at least on superficial 
examination.  This may be a topic worth pursuing.
53 
Of course the most interesting issue that remains is why the GATT/WTO doesn’t seem to 
have had much of an impact on trade.  Personally, I don’t know; I’ve limited myself to asking 
whether the multilateral trade system has mattered, and the reasons for my negative finding are 
unclear.  It would be natural to examine whether GATT/WTO members have systematically  21
lower trade barriers.  Interesting yes, but easy no, given the well-known difficulties associated 
with measuring the stance of trade policy (Pritchett, 1996; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000).  In 
appendix 6 I add tariff rates to the benchmark equation.
54  Tariffs rates have an economically and 
statistically significant negative effect on trade (as seems sensible), and the other gravity 
estimates are hardly changed …, as is the insignificance of GATT/WTO membership.
55  
Appendix 7 delivers the same conclusion with four other measures of trade policy: two indices 
from the Index of Economic Freedom, a measure of price distortions, and black market premia.  
Ongoing research indicates that the negative effect of GATT/WTO membership on trade may 
appear because membership simply has little effect on trade policy.  For now, I simply note that 
my result is consistent with that of the extant econometric literature … since it is the literature. 
 
Parting Shots 
Perhaps the GATT has not had much of an effect on trade … but the WTO will.  Perhaps.  
After all, the contracting parties to the ad hoc and provisional GATT signed legal documents 
about goods trade only to the extent that they were consistent with pre-existing national 
legislation.
56  Members of the WTO use a more wide-reaching permanent framework to resolve 
disputes about trade in goods, services, and intellectual property.  Time will tell. 
  Perhaps the GATT and WTO have large effects on income or welfare but only through 
mechanisms other than trade.  Perhaps.  But if so, this seems like news to us all. 
  Perhaps the GATT and WTO have acted as an international public good, freeing trade for 
all countries independent of whether they are members or not.  Perhaps; one can’t use data to test 
this hypothesis, since there is no data for the counter-factual GATT-free world.
57  But 
membership seems to be a big deal.  Why should anyone care whether China is in the WTO if  22
membership is irrelevant?  It’s not conventional to view the multilateral trade system as a 
GloboCop for all countries, independent of membership.  Still, this story can’t be rejected. 
  Why has trade grown faster than income, if not because of the GATT/WTO?  Who 
knows?  But there are plenty of other candidates.  Higher rates of productivity in tradables, 
falling transport costs, regional trade associations, converging tastes, the shift from primary 
products towards manufacturing and services, growing international liquidity, and changing 
endowments are all possibilities.  But that’s a different topic altogether. 
My quantitative examination indicates that there is little reason to believe that the 
GATT/WTO has had a dramatic effect on trade.  In particular, once standard gravity effects have 
been taken into account, bilateral trade cannot be dependably linked to membership in the WTO 
or its predecessor the GATT.  Since the GSP and other gravity effects have economically and 
statistically significant influences, this negative finding does not seem to be the result of my 
methodology or data set, both of which are common.  I conclude that it is surprisingly hard to 
demonstrate convincingly that the GATT and the WTO have encouraged trade.  One should not 
conclude the GATT and WTO have not increased trade (although I wish it was easier to see in 
the data).  Rather, since common sense and conventional wisdom accord an important role to the 
GATT/WTO in creating trade, I prefer to view this negative result as an interesting mystery.  23
Table 1: Benchmark Results 
 Default  No 
Industrial 
Countries 







































































































































































Observations  234,597 114,615 183,328 234,597 
R
2  .65 .47 .65 .70 
RMSE  1.98 2.36 2.10 1.82 
Regressand: log real trade. 
OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). 
Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.  24
Table 2: Cross-Sectional Analysis 





























































Regressand: log real trade. 
OLS with intercept not reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Regressors included but with unrecorded coefficients: regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log product real 
GDP; log product real GDP p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number islands; log product 
land area; common colonizer; currently colonized; ever colony; and common country.   25
 Table 3: Allowing the Effects to vary over GATT rounds 
































































































Regressand: log real trade. 
OLS with year effects, robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses; or fixed effects. 
Regressors not recorded: GSP; regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log product real GDP; log product real 
GDP p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number islands; log product land area; common 
colonizer; currently colonized; ever colony; and common country; intercepts.  26
Table 4: Allowing the Effects to vary by Region and Income Class 





































































Regressand: log real trade.  OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). 
Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses. 
Regressors not recorded: regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log product real GDP; log product real GDP 
p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number islands; log product land area; common colonizer; 
currently colonized; ever colony; and common country.   27
Table 5: Sample Sensitivity Analysis 

























































Without Poorest Quartile 





































































Regressand: log real trade.  OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported) unless noted. 
Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses. 
Regressors not recorded: regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log product real GDP; log product real GDP 
p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number islands; log product land area; common colonizer; 
currently colonized; ever colony; and common country.   28
Table 6:  Estimation Sensitivity Analysis 



























Controlling for Aggregate 





























Random Effects (GLS) 







Fixed Effects (Within) 







Treatment MLE : Both 





Treatment MLE : One 













































Regressand: log real trade.  OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported) unless noted. 
Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses. 
Regressors not recorded: regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log product real GDP; log product real GDP 
p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number islands; log product land area; common colonizer; 
currently colonized; ever colony; and common country.   29
Table 7: Dynamic Analysis 
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Regressand: log real trade. 
Standard errors in parentheses (robust for OLS and Prais-Winsten). 
Regressors included but with unrecorded coefficients: regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log product real 
GDP; log product real GDP p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number islands; log product 
land area; common colonizer; currently colonized; ever colony; common country; year effects.   30
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2  .65 .63 .12 .65 .65 .65 
RMSE  1.98 2.04 3.13 1.98 1.98 1.98 
Regressand: log real trade.  OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported).  234,597 observations. 
Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.  31
Figure 1: Effect of GATT/WTO entry on Bilateral Trade 
Effect of GATT/WTO entry on Bilateral Trade





































Figure 2: Effect of GATT/WTO entry on Aggregate Openness 
PWT6 data, 1950-98.  Mean, with +/- 2 standard deviations.
Regressions include logs of real GDP and real GDP p/c.
Effect of GATT/WEO entry on Aggregate Openness, (X+M)/Y



































Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Correlation 
with Both in 
GATT/WTO 
Correlation 




Log Real Trade  10.06 3.34  .12  -.08  .24 
Both in GATT/WTO  .49 .50  1.  -.83 .16 
One in GATT/WTO  .42 .49 -.83  1.  -.06 
GSP  .23 .42 .16 -.06  1. 
Log Distance  8.16  .81 .04 .02 .14 
Log product Real GDP  47.88 2.68  .19  -.10  .27 
Log product Real GDP p/c  16.03 1.50  .13  -.05  .35 
Regional FTA  .01 .12 .03 -.04 -.03 
Currency Union  .01 .12 .04 -.04 -.06 
Common Language  .22 .42 .04 -.07 -.06 
Land Border  .03 .17 -.02 -.02 -.09 
Number Landlocked  .25 .47 .01 -.01 .03 
Number Islands  .34 .54 .04 -.02 .00 
Log product Land Area  24.21 3.28  -.02  .02  .04 
Common Colonizer  .10 .30 .02 -.03 -.18 
Currently Colonized  .002 .04  .04  -.04 -.01 
Ever Colony  .02 .14 .04 -.03 .08 
Common Country  .0003 .02  .02  -.01  -.00 
234,597 observations.  33
Appendix 2: Trading Entities in Sample 





































Congo, Dem. Rep. of (Zaire) (1971) 
Congo, Rep. (1963) 
Costa Rica (1990) 
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) (1963) 
Croatia 
Cyprus (1963) 




Dominican Rep. (1950) 
Ecuador (1996) 
Egypt (1970) 




































Korea, South (R) (1967) 
Kuwait (1963) 
Kyrgyz Republic (1998) 

















































Sierra Leone (1961) 
Singapore (1973) 
Slovak Republic (1993) 
Slovenia (1994) 
Solomon Islands (1994) 
Somalia 
South Africa (1948) 
Spain (1963) 
Sri Lanka (1948) 
St. Kitts & Nevis (1994) 
St. Lucia (1993) 


















United Arab Emirates (1994) 
United Kingdom (1948) 






Yemen, Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Fed. R. (1966) 
Zambia (1982) 
Zimbabwe (1948)Appendix 3a: Aggregate Openness and the GATT/WTO   
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Regressand: log of openness (i.e., ratio of exports plus imports to GDP in percent) unless noted. 
Data from PWT6; 158 countries, 1950-1998; 5499 observations unless noted. 
OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*  “Extra Controls” are: a) currency union dummy; b) dependency dummy; c) log of area; d) island dummy; and e) 
landlocked dummy.  Extra controls reduce observations to 4803. 
 
 
Appendix 3b: Aggregate Openness, Tariffs, and the GATT/WTO   









Remoteness Tariffs  R
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Regressand: log of openness (i.e., ratio of exports plus imports to GDP in percent). 
Data from PWT6; 158 countries, 1970-1998; 2099 observations. 
OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Tariffs are import duties as percentage of imports, taken from WDI 2002.  1
Appendix 4: Instrumental Variable Estimates of the GATT/WTO Effect 
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Regressand: log real trade. 
IV: robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses. 
Instrumental variables: Set 1: log product (sum) of two countries’: a) democracy, and b) polity scores.  Set 2: log 
product (sum) of two countries’; a) political rights; b) civil rights; c) freedom scores. 
Regressors not recorded: GSP; regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log product real GDP; log product real 
GDP p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number islands; log product land area; common 
colonizer; currently colonized; ever colony; and common country; year intercepts.  2
Appendix 5: The Effect of WTO/GATT Membership on Exporters and Importers 















OLS with equal GDP exporter 

























Regressand: log real exports from one country to the other.  387,780 observations. 
Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses. 
Regressors not recorded: regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log exporter real GDP; log exporter real GDP 
p/c; log importer real GDP; log importer real GDP p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number 
islands; log product land area; common colonizer; currently colonized; ever colony; common country; and year 
effects.  3






































































































































































    - . 1 4  
(.01) 
Observations
  78,254 78,254 69,859 69,859 
R
2  .71 .71 .69 .69 
RMSE  1.86 1.85 1.90 1.89 
Regressand: log real trade.  OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). 
Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses. 
Tariffs are import duties as percentage of imports, taken from WDI 2002.  4
Appendix 7: Other Measures of Trade Policy in the Benchmark Model 










































     
Sum of IEF Trade Policy sub-
indices  
   -.23 
(.01) 
    
Sum of Dollar’s Price Distortions       1 . 5 2  
(.35) 
  
Sum of Black Market Premia         - . 1 1  
(.04) 
Observations
  21,935 21,935 21,935  7,412  7,412  26,912 26,912 
Regressand: log real trade.  OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). 
Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses. 
Regressors not recorded: regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log product real GDP; log product real GDP 
p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number islands; log product land area; common colonizer; 
currently colonized; ever colony; and common country.   5
Figure A1: Openness and GATT/WTO entry 
Openness and GATT/WTO entry



















































































































































































































Figure A2: Openness and GATT/WTO entry 
Openness and GATT/WTO entry











































































































































































































Figure A3: Openness and GATT/WTO entry 
Openness and GATT/WTO entry















































































































































































































Figure A4: Openness and GATT/WTO entry 
Openness and GATT/WTO entry


































































































































































































Alston, Richard M., J.R. Kearl, and Michael B. Vaughan (1992) “Is there a Consensus Among 
Economists in the 1990s?”  American Economic Review 82-2, 203-209. 
 
Anderson, James and Eric van Wincoop (2002) “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border 
Puzzle” forthcoming American Economic Review. 
 
Deardorff, Alan V. (1998) “Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a 
Neoclassical World?” in The Regionalization of the World Economy (ed.: Jeffrey A. Frankel), 
Chicago: University Press. 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey A. (1997) Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System IIE, 
Washington. 
 
Glick, Reuven and Andrew K. Rose (2002) “Does a Currency Union affect Trade?  The Time-
Series Evidence” European Economic Review. 
 
Gourieroux, Christian and Alain Monfort (1981) “On the Problem of Missing Data in Linear 
Models” Review of Economic Studies XLVIII, 579-586. 
 
Griliches, Zvi (1986) “Economic Data Issues” in Handbook of Econometrics (vol. III, edited by 
Z. Griliches and M.D. Intriligator), Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, pp.1485-1495. 
 
Kearl, J.R., Clayne L. Pope, Gordon C. Whiting, and Larry T. Wimmer (1979) “A Confusion of 
Economists?”  American Economic Review 69-2, 28-37. 
 
Little, Roderick J.A. (1992) “Regression with Missing X’s: A Review” Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 87-420, 1227-1237. 
 
Pritchett, Lant (1996) “Measuring Outward Orientation in LDCs: Can it be done?” Journal of 
Development Economics 49-2, 307-335. 
 
Rodriguez, Francisco and Dani Rodrik (2000) “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s 
Guide to the Cross-National Evidence” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 261-338. 
 
United Nations, Operation and Effects of the Generalized System of Preferences, various issues. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2002) Introductory Econometrics, South-Western, New York.  8
Endnotes 
 
1  Kearl et. al. (1979, p. 30) show that 97% of economists surveyed in 1976 agreed (generally or with provisions) 
that “Tariffs and import quotas reduce general economic welfare.” Alston et. al. (1992, p. 204) show that 93% 
agreed with this statement in 1990. 
2  For the record; I am a mainstream economist with no anti-trade or anti-WTO agenda.  Ask my colleagues if you 
don’t believe me. 
3  Taken from http://www.wto.org/wto/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr02_e.htm 
4  Press brief available at http://www.wto.org/wto/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm 
5  Taken from http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr01_e.htm.  Alternatively, the WTO at 
http://www.wto.org/english/the wto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm  states “GATT was provisional with a limited field 
of action, but its success over 47 years in promoting and securing the liberalization of much of world trade is 
incontestable.  Continual reductions in tariffs alone helped spur very high rates of world trade growth ...”   Finally, 
the agreement establishing the WTO states that its objective is “… expanding the production of and trade in goods 
and services, … by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade …”, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-
wto.pdf 
6  Economist, December 2, 1999. 
7  For instance, the WTO itself states that the bilateral accession negotiations “… constitute the most critical element 
of the accessions process as Members want to ensure that acceding governments grant concessions which are 
comparable to the concessions that they will be benefiting from in the markets of Members.  The resulting market-
access commitments of acceding governments can be considered to be the payment for the entry ticket into the 
WTO.”  See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto08/wto8_53.htm#note3.  Alternatively, the 
WTO describes the second step of the accession process as “Work out with us individually what you have to offer” 
and states “In other words, the talks determine the benefits (in the form of export opportunities and guarantees) other 
WTO members can expect when the new member joins.”  See 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm. 
8  One recent empirical reference is Frankel (1997).  Theoretical discussions can be found in Deardorff (1998) and 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2002). 
9  One of GATT’s most important principles was nondiscrimination, embodied in both the obligation to provide 
national treatment to imports and the extension of unconditional most favored nation (MFN) status to other 
members (exceptions to MFN were permissible through e.g., the GSP and regional trade agreements).  While 
members sometimes extended MFN to non-members, they were under no obligation to do so. 
10  Though I am forced to drop observations from the regression analysis if they have no usable data for e.g., output.  
The only omissions of any importance are: a) Taiwan; and b) some centrally planned economies (though there is 
extensive coverage of e.g., Poland, Hungary, and Romania both before and after 1989). 
11  Expressed alternatively, fifty countries have Penn World Table 6 data available for both 1950 and 1998.  During 
this period, these countries experienced growth in their average ratios of exports plus imports to GDP from 47% to 
74%. 
12  I use the Glick-Rose data set practice (and indeed their data set through 1997); wherever possible, I use “World 
Development Indicators” data (taken from the World Bank’s WDI 2000 CD-ROM except for 1998-99 which is 
taken from WDI 2002).  When the data are unavailable from the World Bank, I fill in missing observations with 
comparables from the Penn World Table Mark 5.6, and (when all else fails), from the IMF’s “International Financial 
Statistics” (converting national currency GDP figures into dollars at the current dollar exchange rate).  The series 
have been checked and corrected for errors. 
13  Available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html 
14  Following Glick-Rose, “currency union” means essentially that money was interchangeable between the two 
countries at a 1:1 par for an extended period of time, so that there was no need to convert prices.  The basic source 
for currency union data is the IMF’s Schedule of Par Values and issues of the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  I supplement this with information from annual copies of The 
Statesman’s Yearbook. 
15  Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm 
16  Available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm 
17  Both the GATT and the WTO allow independent customs territories to join; for instance, Hong Kong joined the 
GATT in 1986 and Macao in 1991.  9
                                                                                                                                                             
18  In 1948, 78% of global trade in the data set was conducted strictly between GATT members.  This dipped to 56% 
in 1950, before rising to 65% in 1960, 79% in 1970, 70% in 1980, 88% in 1990, and 86% in 1999.  These fractions 
are over-estimates since my data set does not include Taiwan and a few members of the second world. 
19  A number of countries have also left the GATT when their governments were overthrown, including the founding 
members China, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia. 
20  Most countries (e.g., those in the EEC, Austria, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) began to 
extend GSP concessions in 1971, though there were exceptions.  The USSR began to extend GSP preferences in 
1965; Australia in 1966; Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and New Zealand in 1972; Canada in 1974; and 
Poland and the US in 1976.   Unfortunately, I do not have information on bilateral GSP concessions on an annual 
basis, and Stefano Inama at UNCTAD has informed me that no such data set currently exists.  I therefore construct 
the variable by extending 1974 GSP preferences back to the original extension of the GSP, and forward to 1976; I 
extend 1979 preferences to cover the period from 1977 through 1981; and the 1984 preferences are used to cover the 
period from 1982 through the end of the sample (adding the entrants into the EC/EU as they joined). 
21  The correlations tabulated in Appendix 1 are simple.  Nevertheless, they deliver the right message; a multiple 
regression of “bothin” on the other variables (including year effects) yields an R
2 of only .13, while the analogue for 
“onein” is only .05. 
22  It is well known that richer countries tend to be more open, while larger countries tend to be less open.  I verify 
this in Appendix 3a with simple regression techniques.  These also include “remoteness” which is defined for 
country i as the inverse of the mean of log real GDP for country j divided by the log of distance between i and j.  
That is, remotenessi,t =J/Σ jYj,t/Dij where Yj,t is the log of real GDP for j at t, and Dij is the log distance between i and 
j.  Appendix 3b adds the tariff measure discussed below. 
23  I omit plots for six countries that lack time-series PWT6 data: Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Mongolia, Qatar, and 
Swaziland. 
24  In the absence of a consensus model for aggregate openness, I stick to the bilateral gravity model for my 
regression analysis below.  Still, simple regression of aggregate openness on GATT/WTO membership delivers 
negative results, as shown in Appendix 3; aggregate openness is essentially uncorrelated with GATT/WTO 
membership. 
25  It is worth noting that the coefficients for GDP and GDP per capita sum to more than one, so that an increase in 
GDP per capita holding population constant will raise trade more than proportionately. 
26  The year fixed effects are small, and fall with time, beginning at around –25 in 1948 and falling gradually to –28 
by the end of the sample. 
27  I follow the IMF in defining countries as “industrial” if they have an IFS country code less than 200.  No, the 
GSP coefficient is not a mistake; some (non-industrial) Eastern European countries extended GSP preferences. 
28  This is a potentially important check, given the results of Anderson and van Wincoop (2002). 
29  Dummy variables for regional (e.g., South Asia) and income (e.g., Low Income) groupings were created using 
the lists in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
30  Industrial countries are again defined as those with IFS country codes of less than 200; some of these countries 
received GSP preferences. 
31  In particular, I drop observations with estimated residuals that lie more than three standard deviations from zero, 
which amounts to about one percent of the sample.  I have also used different thresholds with similar results. 
32  Canada, France, the UK and the USA were founding GATT members, while there is no Italian data before its 
GATT entry in 1950.  Thus both γ 1 and γ 2 can be estimated only for Japan and Germany. 
33  The t-statistic is 2.11, significant at the 4% significance level.   
Parenthetically, the moderately positive evidence for industrial countries is a piece in a continuing but 
inconsistent and vague pattern.  There is also weak evidence that dropping small and poor countries delivers bigger 
results, and that the effects of the GATT were larger at the beginning of the sample when the institution was (even) 
more dominated by the industrial countries.  Further, founding members of the GATT have had their trade grow 
more than later entrants.  The last column of Table 8 contains dummy variables for one or both countries being 
GATT founders (in practice, contracting partners in 1948 or 1949).  The coefficients for both variables are positive 
and significant, though again not overwhelmingly so.  By way of contrast, for later entrants, the maximum number 
of years that the parties had both been in the GATT/WTO has a slight negative effect on trade, while the minimum 
number of years both countries had been members has essentially no effect on trade.  Perhaps the GATT was the 
hand servant of its (mostly rich) creators?  The evidence is weak, but it seems to be an angle worth pursuing.  10
                                                                                                                                                             
34  It is worth highlighting the fact that regional trade associations seem typically to have a much larger effect than 
the multilateral GATT/WTO system; nine of the ten RTAs have point estimates greater than .7 (all are statistically 
significant), indicating that trade at least doubles with membership.  Curiously, the outlier is the EEC/EC/EU. 
35  Adding interactions between the gravity regressors and my key GATT/WTO dummy variable does not change 
any conclusions.  For instance, adding an interaction between (the log of the product of real) GDP and the dummy 
for both countries being GATT/WTO members delivers a coefficient of .08 with a standard error of .01; but the 
coefficient on joint membership falls to -3.93.  Since the sample average of GDP is 47.88, the net average effect on 
trade of joint GATT/WTO membership is (.08*47.88)-3.93 =-.1, and results for other interactions are similar. 
36  Throughout, I use the full set of gravity variables as both determinants of treatment assignation and as regressors 
in the trade equation. 
37  Indeed, the first stage shows that countries inside the GATT/WTO have significantly higher output. 
38  I do the last by replacing the smallest five percent of the sample trade observations by zero (altering the threshold 
from 5% has no substantive effect). 
39  The Arellano-Bond estimates use data only from 1960 through 1999 for computational reasons. 
40  Thus the long-run effects are around five times the tabulated coefficients.  The AB estimate for the lagged 
dependent variable is around .35. 
41  I have also added leads of GATT/WTO accession with similarly weak results. 
42  I have substituted the de facto dates of GATT accession (listed inside the front cover of the GATT’s International 
Trade, though I only have them from 1970 onwards) in place of actual GATT accession, without changing any 
results.  
43  The data sources are: 1) The Polity IV Project on Political Regime Characteristic and Transitions, 1800-1999 
available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/ciddm/inscr/polity, and 2) Freedom House’s Country Ratings from their 
Annual Survey of Freedom 1972-73 to 1999-00, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/ 
44  There are approximately 327,000 country-pair x year annual observations on trade, so almost 100,000 
observations are dropped because of missing output data. 
45  The most important effect is income; the effect of GATT/WTO membership jumps as soon as the (log of the 
product of the two countries’) GDP is excluded from the equation. 
46  Even excluding the 32 in the appendices… 
47  The largest estimate of γ 1 is in Table 8, but excludes all gravity controls by design.  The remaining three are not 
significant at the .01 confidence level. 
48  One can also compute “meta-estimates” across the coefficient estimates.  The meta-fixed effect estimate of γ 1 is -
.01, while the random effect meta-estimate is .03 (the latter is insignificantly different from zero).  By way of 
contrast, the meta-fixed and random estimates for γ 3 are .38 and .63, both economically and statistically significant. 
49  A quick investigation yields little on these lines; the results are tabulated in Appendix 5.  The data set used in 
these calculations is much larger and is hence available only for one year upon receipt of a formatted CD-R or CD-
RW along with a self-addressed stamped mailer and an e-address. 
50  My estimates of γ 1 and γ 2 are highly correlated across experiments, and rarely of opposite sign. 
51  Article I section (ii) of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement states that its purpose is “To facilitate the expansion and 
balanced growth of international trade …” 
52  Country data is taken from http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/tad/exfin1.cfm 
53  On the one hand, the result seems robust in my data set; for instance, fixed effect estimators deliver the same 
results.  But don’t get over-excited.  Over 88% of my observations record trade between two members of the Fund 
(and another 11% for trade between one Fund member and a non-member).  Accounting more completely for the 
trade of countries outside the Fund would be important for those interested in this issue (especially given that the 
data set stems from the Fund!).  This would mainly mean including the “second world” which is not an easy task.  
Parenthetically, World Bank members must also be Fund members. 
54  These are taken from the 2002 WDI and are expressed as a percentage of imports.  This is one of the few 
measures of trade policy not condemned by Rodriguez and Rodrik. 
55  The simple correlation of “bothin” with the sum of tariffs is only -.13, while the correlation with the log of the 
tariff product is only -.11. 
56  Further, the GATT built in a large number of devices to allow countries (technically “contracting parties”) to 
pursue their own policies.  For instance, article VI of the GATT allowed countries to respond to dumping; article XII 
allowed a response for balance of payments considerations; article XVIII allowed protectionism for developing 
countries; there were opt-outs in articles XIX through XXI for a variety of reasons including public morals, health,  11
                                                                                                                                                             
security, and so forth; article XXXV allowed particular countries simply to ignore other members of the GATT; and 
there was a procedure to waive obligations in article XXV.  That is, there was plenty of room for countries to be in 
GATT de jure without adhering to the spirit of the agreement. 
57  And of course in this case we still wouldn’t know that the multilateral system has stimulated trade; it would be an 
untestable article of faith. 